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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
          
v. 
 
WESLEY THOMAS,  
       Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:15-cr-00121-003) 
District Judge: Honorable Gerald J. Pappert 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
on June 17, 2021 
 
Before: McKEE, GREENAWAY, JR., and BIBAS, Circuit Judges 
 










Pro se appellant Wesley Thomas appeals the District Court’s order denying his motion 
for compassionate release. The Government has filed a motion for summary affirmance. 
For the reasons that follow, we grant the Government’s motion and will summarily affirm 
the District Court’s judgment. 
In 2015, Thomas pleaded guilty to four counts of Hobbs Act robbery and two counts of 
brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c). He was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. See E.D. Pa. Cr. No. 2-15-cr-
00121-003, ECF 66 at 2. In October 2020, Thomas filed a motion for compassionate release 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). He argued that he was entitled to a reduced sentence 
because the District Court imposed consecutive sentences for his convictions under 
§ 924(c), which was, according to Thomas, not permitted by the First Step Act since the 
convictions were charged in the same indictment. He also stated that he was at a heightened 
risk of contracting COVID-19 in prison, that his medical conditions increase the risk of 
severe illness or death from COVID-19, and that his father was sick and needed his care.   
The District Court denied the motion, concluding that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors 
did not support the request and that Thomas did not present “extraordinary and compelling 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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reasons for release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The Court noted that Thomas is serving a 
sentence far below the mandatory minimum for the crimes he committed, that he has served 
less than half of that sentence, and that Thomas’s health conditions were managed by the 
prison such that his few risk factors did not warrant release. Thomas filed a notice of ap-
peal, and the Government has moved for summary affirmance. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s order for 
abuse of discretion. See United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2020). We 
may summarily affirm if “no substantial question is presented” by the appeal. 3d Cir. 
L.A.R. 27.4. 
We will grant the Government’s motion. The compassionate-release provision states 
that a district court “may reduce the term of imprisonment” and “impose a term of proba-
tion or supervised release” if it finds that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant 
such a reduction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Before granting compassionate release, a 
district court must consider “the factors set forth in § 3553(a) to the extent that they are 
applicable.” § 3582(c)(1)(A). Those factors include, among other things, “the nature and 
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” 
§ 3553(a)(1), and the need for the sentence “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to 
promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense”; “to afford 
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct”; and “to protect the public from further crimes of 
the defendant,” § 3553(a)(2)(A)–(C). 
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We discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s conclusion that the § 3553(a) 
factors weighed against granting compassionate release here.1 As the District Court ex-
plained, Thomas’s crimes were “violent robberies” and “he earned his sentence by know-
ingly and voluntarily facilitating [them].” ECF No. 139 at 8. It was also reasonable for the 
District Court to conclude that the fact that Thomas had served less than half of his lengthy 
sentence worked against him. See, e.g., Pawlowski, 967 F.3d at 330-31.2 We therefore do 
not have “a definite and firm conviction that [the District Court] committed a clear error of 
judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” Id. at 330 
(alteration omitted) (quoting Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 146 (3d Cir. 2000)). 




1 Based on this conclusion, we need not address Thomas’s described “extraordinary and 
compelling reasons.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). For Thomas’s benefit, we note that, 
contrary to the argument he presented in the District Court, the First Step Act did not 
eliminate the subsection of § 924(c) that requires sentences under that section to run con-
secutively. See § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii); United States v. Hodge, 948 F.3d 160, 161 n.2 (3d Cir. 
2020). 
2 We need not decide here whether, as Thomas argues for the first time on appeal, the 
First Step Act’s change to § 924(c)’s sentencing provisions is relevant to the § 3553(a) 
factors. Even if that change is relevant, there is no plain error based on any claimed fail-
ure to consider it. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Long, 997 F.3d 342, 353 
(D.C. Cir. 2021). The District Court recognized that the change in law would decrease the 
mandatory minimum sentence for someone like Thomas with two convictions for bran-
dishing a firearm from 32 years’ imprisonment to 14, but that, through his plea agree-
ment, Thomas received only a ten-year sentence, lighter than even the present law pre-
scribes.  
